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Abstract 
 
We investigate the quality of the investment choices that sponsors of defined contribution 
plans offer to plan participants for their retirement portfolios.  Using a unique database of 
over 30,000 plans, we calculate the performance of equity-oriented investment options 
that were included in plans compared to a sample of funds that were not.  On average, 
plan options produce annualized risk-adjusted returns exceeding those of non-plan 
options by as much as 120 basis points, an outcome that is relatively insensitive to factor 
model specifications, time period, or investment style classification.  This performance 
advantage is largely due to actively managed plan options and privately managed 
institutional funds do not appear to enjoy any incremental performance advantage relative 
to public mutual funds.  We conclude that plan sponsors do appear to possess superior 
selection skills when designing the set of investment options offered to plan participants. 
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1.  Introduction and Summary 
One of the more notable trends to emerge in the management of retirement assets over 
the past two decades is the rapid ascent of defined contribution plans as a primary vehicle 
by which retirement portfolio savings are accumulated.  For example, the Investment 
Company Institute reports that between 1994 and the second quarter of 2011, the assets 
invested 401(k), 403(b), and 457 plans—the three leading types of defined contribution 
plans—in the United States rose from $1.4 trillion to $4.7 trillion, outpacing the 
percentage increase in the assets managed by the entire U.S. retirement market (i.e., $5.9 
to $18.2 trillion).  By contrast, assets under management in private defined benefit plans 
over this period only increased from $1.3 to $2.5 trillion, a far more modest rate of 
expansion.  In fact, by 2011, defined contribution plans were matched in importance only 
by government pension plans ($4.5 trillion) and individual retirement accounts ($4.9 
trillion) as a source of retirement funds. 
  Given their popularity as a retirement savings alternative, it is not surprising that 
defined contribution plans have begun to receive considerable scrutiny from researchers.  
To date, the vast majority of this literature appears to be concerned with the way that plan 
participants choose the funds in which they invest as well as with the subsequent 
investment performance of those funds.  Several stylized facts summarize these findings, 
which have concentrated on 401(k) plans.  First, investors are typically either under- or 
over-allocated toward equity in their asset allocation decision and tend to trade or 
rebalance their portfolios on an infrequent basis (Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003)).  
Second, when offered the choice, 401(k) participants also tend to invest too heavily in the 
stock of the company sponsoring the plan, which Huberman (2001) calls the “familiarity 
breeds investment” effect.  Finally, Huberman and Jiang (2006) document that plan 
participants tend to allocate their contributions evenly across the funds they select—the 
so-called “1/N” strategy—a portfolio formation decision that can be justified on a both an  
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analytical (DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2007)) and behavioral (Benartzi and Thaler 
(2001)) basis.
1 
  On the other hand, far less is known about the motivations and decision-making 
abilities of the institutions that sponsor defined contribution plans.  This is somewhat 
puzzling given Elton, Gruber, and Blake’s (2006) observation that the portfolio choices 
made by participants in these plans are themselves a function of the fund choices offered 
by the plan sponsors.  Thus, if the options made available to participants are either 
insufficient or lacking in some other way, it may be impossible for them to allocate their 
assets in an optimal manner.  Indeed, in their study focusing on the 401(k) market, those 
authors concluded that just over half of the plans they examined offered an adequate set 
of mutual fund choices, which they defined as one capable of spanning the space 
delineated by eight asset- and style-class indexes.   
  Further, although the extant evidence is quite limited, it is not clear that the choices 
that 401(k) sponsors do offer to investors are superior to those that they do not.  Elton, 
Gruber, and Blake (2007) looked at the risk-adjusted performance of the publicly traded 
mutual funds selected by a small sample (i.e., 43) of plan sponsors over the period from 
1994 to 1999 and provided mixed evidence regarding how these plan options fared 
relative to a set of passively and actively managed alternatives.  Specifically, they found 
that the funds offered to plan participants outperformed a randomly selected set of style-
matched funds, but produced negative alphas relative to the passive benchmark 
portfolios.
2  By contrast, in a related study from the defined benefit plan literature, Goyal 
and Wahal (2008) demonstrated that the decisions made by plan sponsors when hiring or 
firing active portfolio managers did not subsequently lead to superior performance.   
Further, Cohen and Schmidt (2009) have suggested that mutual fund companies appear to 
overweight the stock of plan sponsor companies in their family of portfolios in order to 
attract potential defined contribution business, a policy that could erode the overall 
performance to their non-plan investors. 
                                                 
1  Other examples of this literature include Madrian and Shea (2001), Poterba (2003), Choi, Laibson, 
Madrian, and Metrick (2006), and Huberman, Iyengar, and Jiang (2007).  See also Brown, Liang and 
Weisbenner (2006, 2007). 
2  Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2007) also documented that plan funds outperformed non-plan, non-index 
funds by roughly the amount of the fee differential (1.9 basis points) that existed between the two samples.  
This raises the possibility that the “skill” that plan sponsors possess simply amounts to selecting lower-cost 
funds.  
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  Although the preceding findings are suggestive, they offer an incomplete picture of 
the design and investment performance of the menu of investment choices offered to 
participants in a defined contribution plan.  In particular, a substantial amount of assets in 
these plans are not invested in publicly traded mutual funds.  For instance, the Investment 
Company Institute (2011) reported that in 2010 only 56.0% of plan assets were held in 
mutual funds, with the majority of what remained invested in privately managed 
institutional portfolios or the sponsoring company’s own stock.  As a consequence, it is 
difficult to judge the quality of the retirement portfolio choices the sponsors provide to 
participants without examining the performance of these privately managed alternatives.  
Additionally, given the legal mandate that sponsors face to provide a diversified 
collection of alternatives to participants in the plans, it is likely that both the selection and 
composition of the active and passive management options differs from that found in a 
less restrictive environment.
3  In fact, the additional explicit and implicit constraints faced 
by sponsors with regard to the choices they offer represent a contracting challenge that 
can potentially have a material impact on investment performance, along the lines of 
Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004).   
  In this paper, we extend the literature on the role played by the plan sponsor in the 
investment performance of a defined contribution plan in a number of ways.  Our 
investigation is based on a unique dataset maintained by the largest plan administrator in 
the industry and consists of the investment options offered by more than 27,000 sponsors 
of over 30,000 plans during the period from January 2000 to June 2007.  These 
investment options are delineated along several lines (e.g., equity investment style, 
passive vs. active management, private vs. public fund) that permit a number of new 
questions to be addressed.  To facilitate this analysis, we also develop a sample of 
otherwise comparable investment vehicles that sponsors chose not t o  s e l e c t  a s  p l a n  
options.  The investment returns generated by these non-plan options serve as an indirect 
assessment of the opportunity cost of the sponsors’ selection skills inasmuch as they 
proxy for the next-best collection of investment choices that could have been offered to 
plan participants.  Thus, in addition to examining the overall level of plan performance 
relative to expectations, this methodological design also allows us to assess the ability of 
                                                 
3  Many of the legal restrictions imposed on the plan sponsor in its role as a fiduciary are discussed in more 
detail in the next section.  
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plan sponsors to create a superior menu of plan options from which the participants’ 
retirement portfolio decisions are made. 
  Focusing on the equity-oriented funds that were either included or not included in a 
defined contribution plan, we develop and test four different hypotheses regarding the 
selection skills of plan sponsors.  First, we posit that the investment options that sponsors 
offer to plan participants produce superior risk-adjusted returns relative to those options 
that are not selected for the plan.  Second, we consider the possibility that it is the set of 
actively managed (i.e., non-index fund) options that determine any measurable 
performance differential between plan and non-plan options.  Third, as a complement to 
the previous conjecture, we argue that passively managed plan options may outperform 
passively managed non-plan options.  Finally, within the set of actively managed plan 
options, we examine whether funds managed in private accounts outperform public 
mutual funds on a risk-adjusted basis, perhaps due to differences in the operating costs 
and investment restrictions faced by private and public managers. 
  To control for the possibility of model and time period misspecification, we calculate 
risk-adjusted performance statistics (i.e., alphas) for our plan and non-plan investment 
option samples using three different variations of a multi-factor risk model and over three 
different sub-periods of the entire 90-month sample period.  Our findings, which remain 
invariant to the myriad modeling adjustments, indicate that, on average, plan options 
significantly outperform non-plan options after controlling for risk and expenses.  The 
mean alpha differential over the entire sample period was about 10 basis points per 
month, which compounds to more than 120 basis points per annum, net of fees.  Based on 
substantial analysis designed to test the robustness of this result with respect to how 
alphas are measured and aggregated both within an annual cross section as well as over 
time, we find that the outcome holds, to slightly different degrees, across all equity style 
classes and sub-intervals of the overall sample period.   
  Further, we demonstrate that the set of actively managed investment funds is almost 
exclusively responsible for this performance differential; the difference in active plan and 
non-plan alphas was especially strong (i.e., about 20 basis points per month) during the 
weak equity market of 2000-2002.  On the other hand, non-plan index funds produce 
slightly larger alphas than passively managed plan funds, particularly in the earliest 
sample sub-period.  Finally, among the collection of actively managed products offered  
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within the plan sample, there appears to be little difference in risk-adjusted performance 
between privately and publicly managed options when the funds are pooled on an equally 
weighted basis.  However, when these alpha measures are calculated on a participant- or 
plan asset-weighted basis, the preponderance of the evidence points to a slight tendency 
for public mutual funds to produce superior returns relative to private institutional 
accounts.  This is a surprising outcome given the a priori advantages that private account 
managers appear to enjoy in terms of lower expenses and more predictable cash flows.  
Overall, on the basis of the strength and consistency of these findings, we conclude that 
the sponsors of defined contribution plans possess legitimate selections skills that allow 
them to discriminate between potential portfolio options in a meaningful way. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we discuss 
how a typical defined contribution plan is organized in terms of the number of investment 
alternatives offered to participants and provide descriptive statistics on how the industry 
has evolved in recent years.  In Section 3, we describe the data we use in the empirical 
analysis, while in the fourth and fifth sections we develop and test the hypotheses 
regarding plan sponsor behavior.  Section 6 provides a more detailed analysis of the 
cross-sectional differences in the actively managed portion of the plan option sample and 
Section 7 concludes the study. 
 
2.  Defined Contribution Plan Organization and the Plan Sponsor’s Decision 
As provided for by the United States Congress in the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 and subsequent amendments (e.g., the Tax Reform Act of 
1978, Pension Protection Act of 2006), defined contribution retirement plans represent 
multi-faceted arrangements between at least four economic agents: the plan participant, 
the plan sponsor, the plan administrator/service provider, and the plan investment 
managers.  In a typical plan, a portion of an employee’s (i.e., the plan participant) salary 
is deducted on a pre-tax basis by the employer (i.e., the plan sponsor) and earmarked for 
investment in the plan portfolio.  Depending on the specific nature of the plan, these 
deductions are usually made on a voluntary basis by the participant and may be matched 
by additional contributions from the sponsor.  These funds are then turned over to a third-
party (i.e., the plan administrator/service provider), who provides an array of services to 
both the participant and the sponsor.  The most important of these services are (i) the  
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investment of the earmarked funds in a pre-selected set of alternative investment vehicles 
(i.e., the plan investment managers), (ii) the administration (e.g., record-keeping, 
statement creation, check processing) of the plan for the sponsor on behalf of the 
participant, and (iii) assisting the sponsor in providing financial information and 
investment guidance to the participant.
4  Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the various 
relationships linking the agents involved in a retirement plan. 
  A critical aspect of this network of relationships is that the plan participant is 
ultimately responsible for deciding how the plan assets are to be invested among the 
available investment alternatives.  In fact, shifting the risk of the portfolio investment 
outcome to the participant is perhaps the main reason why the defined contribution form 
of retirement investing has become popular among plan sponsors.  Still, as the party 
responsible for selecting the menu of investment options available to plan participants, 
the plan sponsor is a fiduciary under the plan.
5  In order to limit the plan sponsor’s 
fiduciary responsibility to just this selection of investment options—and not to the 
participant’s ultimate investment among them—ERISA Section 404(c), as interpreted by 
regulations issued by the Department of Labor, generally requires the sponsor to diversify 
the set of plan choices by offering “…a participant or beneficiary an opportunity to 
choose, from a broad range of investment alternatives, the manner in which some or all of 
the assets in his account are invested (p. 490).”  Over time, this requirement has come to 
be interpreted as an obligation to provide at least three investment choices that are (i) 
diversified and have materially different risk-return characteristics, and (ii) allow the 
participant to create an appropriate range of risk-return outcomes when used in 
combination with one another to form a retirement savings portfolio.  In practice, this 
                                                 
4  The preceding description is an abbreviated overview of an extremely complex subject and is merely 
intended to focus the discussion on the specific issue at hand.  For a more complete treatment of the 
organizational design of a defined contribution retirement plan, see Baker, Logue, and Rader (2005). 
5  Formally, a fiduciary in this context is any entity that has control over the management of an employee 
benefit plan or its assets. This definition is broad enough to include the plan sponsor.  In fact, it is so broad 
that, but for the exception provided by Section 404(c) of ERISA, the plan sponsor would even be 
responsible for the ultimate investment decisions of the plan participants (i.e., choosing one investment 
option over another available one).  It is therefore critical that plan sponsors comply with Section 404(c) 
and, even if they do, they still have fiduciary responsibility for selecting the menu of available plan options.   
Further, under ERISA, all actions taken by a fiduciary must be for the exclusive benefit of plan participants 
and beneficiaries and fiduciaries must exercise the care, skill, and diligence that would be used by a 
reasonably prudent person familiar with such matters.  See McGill, Brown, Haley, and Schieber (2005) for 
a more detailed discussion of both the responsibilities of fiduciaries and the rights of participants in the 
pension plan market.  
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interpretation suggests that equities, fixed-income, and cash equivalents be the three asset 
classes included in the minimum set of alternatives. 
  Designing a defined contribution plan that simultaneously satisfies the fiduciary 
obligations of the sponsor while meeting the needs of the participants and controlling 
expenses is obviously a challenging task.  For this reason, sponsors quite frequently 
engage an outside administrator/service provider to assist with this process, along with 
consultants that have no direct control over the management or administration of the 
assets.  Drawn from a wide spectrum of the investment management industry (e.g., 
Fidelity Employer Services Company, Vanguard, TIAA-CREF, AIG-Valic, Charles 
Schwab, ING, Nationwide Financial, T. Rowe Price Group), these service providers are 
typically better equipped to assist the sponsor in creating a menu of investment 
alternatives that will address the range of financial situations faced by participants in the 
plan.  Depending on the scope of the service provider’s operations, the portfolios defining 
these investment choices can be managed by the internal staff of an affiliated division, by 
external managers and sub-advisors, or by some combination of the two.  While the 
gamut of design features that fall within the plan administrator’s influence is subject to 
negotiation with the sponsor, it often includes the number of plan investment choices, the 
asset classes covered by the choices, the specific investment vehicles representing the 
designated asset classes, and whether those investment vehicles are available from public 
(i.e., mutual fund) or private account managers.  Thus, one of the principal criteria a plan 
sponsor will use to judge the performance of a service provider is the investment 
performance of any plan investment options that are managed by the service provider or 
its affiliates.
6 
  A recent survey of plan sponsors and service providers conducted by Plansponsor 
magazine reveals several interesting aspects of the organizational structure of the defined 
contribution industry.
7  For the 5,973 defined contribution plan sponsors surveyed, 
roughly two-thirds of the plans (64.0%) had fewer than 500 participants and, on average, 
73.8% of the eligible employees choose to participate.  The plans also tended to be small 
                                                 
6  As the portfolio distortion findings of Cohen and Schmidt (2009) indicate, the nature of the relationship 
between the plan sponsor and service provider can create potential conflicts of interest.  In this regard, 
Davis and Kim (2007) also document that mutual fund companies that derive a large portion of their 
income as plan administrators are more likely to vote with management in proxy contests. 
7  The results of the survey were published in the November 2008 issue of the magazine and are available 
on their public website at www.plansponsor.com.  The Investment Company Institute (2011) also provides 
a useful analysis of the economic motivations and statistical trends in this industry.  
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in scale; 71.8% of them had fewer than $50 million in total assets under management.  
Further, the mean (median) number of investment options offered by the plans was 18.8 
(16.0), but the mean (median) number of options held by participants was just 5.2 (4.2).  
Interestingly, only 9.5% of the plans offered the sponsor’s company stock as an 
investment option, while the most popular option was in the “target date fund” category 
(39.9%).  Finally, when asked to rank on a 1-7 scale the importance of various factors 
associated with the performance of a service provider, plan sponsors indicated the 
strongest preferences for service and investment performance factors (Quality of Service 
to Participants: 6.65; Quality of Service to Sponsor: 6.50; Investment Performance: 6.38), 
milder preferences for choice and fee factors (Variety of Investment Options: 6.17; 
Reasonableness of Fees: 6.16), and relatively low preferences for reputation and 
recognition factors (Reputation of Service Provider: 5.76; and Recognizable “Brand 
Name” Fund Options: 5.36). 
 
3.  Data Description 
3.1  Plan Administrator Data Sample 
The primary source of the information used in this study comes from the proprietary 
database of defined contribution plans maintained by Fidelity Employer Services 
Company LLC, the largest work-place pension plan administrator and service provider in 
the world.
8  The data consist of the relevant characteristics describing all of the defined 
contribution plans for which the company served as record-keeper for the period from 
January 2000 to June 2007.  In particular, for each plan we obtained the following 
records at various points during the overall sample period: (i) the number of participants 
involved, (ii) the total assets under management, (iii) the total number, identities, and 
investment attributes (e.g., public vs. private fund, equity vs. fixed-income) of the 
investment options held by participants, and (iv) monthly net-of-fee returns to all of the 
available investment options. 
    Table 1 summarizes several of the salient characteristics of this defined 
contribution plan sample.  In Panel A, we list year-end statistics regarding the number of 
sponsors, plans, participants, and assets under management in the sample, as well as the 
                                                 
8   Fidelity Employers Services Company operates as a subsidiary of Fidelity Investments Institutional 
Services Company Inc.  In its role as a provider of retirement, benefits and human resources services, it is 
completely separate and distinct from Fidelity Management & Research Company, the investment 
management and advisory subsidiary of Fidelity Investments.  
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distribution of available plan options offered by the sponsors.  By any measure, the 
collection is a large one, comprising over 27,000 plan sponsors, over 30,000 plans, 12.5 
million participants, and total assets of almost $900 billion.
9  Further, the size of the plans 
in terms of both the average number of participants per plan and the average assets under 
management per plan increased over the sample period, allowing for the equity market 
downturn that ended in 2002.  Of more importance for the present analysis, however, is 
the fact that sponsors appear to offer plan participants a sizeable number of investment 
options.  Across the entire sample, there were 635,215 total options (i.e., the sum of the 
number of investment alternatives across all plans) offered by the last reporting date, 
which corresponds to an average of 23.22 options per plan.  Notice also that the mean 
number of options per plan increased steadily during the sample period from a starting 
point of fewer than 15 products.
10  Finally, the reported ranges of the minimum (one) and 
maximum (696) number of investment options that were actually held by participants 
within a plan suggest that there is a considerable degree of heterogeneity within the 
sample.
11 
  Panel B of Table 1 provides a more detailed breakdown on the nature of the plan 
options that sponsors offer.  Percentage allocation statistics are listed for three main 
divisions of the plan option sample according to (i) asset classes, (ii) whether the plan 
option was managed privately in an institutional account or in a public mutual fund, and 
                                                 
9  Due to corporate restructuring events such as mergers or acquisitions, some plan sponsors in the sample 
are affiliated with multiple retirement plans (e.g., Verizon is affiliated with several different plans as a 
result of the company’s merger activity). 
10   It is not universally accepted that more is better than fewer when it comes to the number of investment 
alternatives included in a retirement plan.  Cronqvist and Thaler (2004) suggest that having to select among 
a large number of options can make an already complex portfolio choice problem unduly complicated for 
many unsophisticated participants.  The “libertarian paternalism” approach to plan design promoted by 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008, Ch. 7 and 9) would recommend that sponsors offer such investors a pre-
packaged set of diversified funds as a default condition; see also Thaler and Sunstein (2003). 
11   At this point, it is worth recalling that the plan administrator performs a separate and very different 
function than the plan investment managers, who may or may not have any direct affiliation with the 
service provider’s parent organization.  Thus, although the reported data are provided by a single service 
provider (i.e., Fidelity Employer Services Company), they represent the combined efforts of scores of 
different money management institutions.  In fact, portfolio managers not employed by Fidelity 
Management & Research Company control 74.04% of all the plan options contained in the sample—both 
public funds and private accounts—a figure consistent with that organization’s market share in the money 
management industry as a whole.  Nevertheless, to insure that no implicit conflict of interests exist in our 
sample, we have replicated the entire empirical analysis described below with the subset of plan options 
created by removing all funds associated with Fidelity Investments.  This adjustment had no material 
impact on the findings or conclusions; these supplementary results are available upon request.  
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(iii) whether the plan option followed a passive or active investment mandate.
12  Further, 
these allocation percentages are tabulated by (i) the number of plan options available, (ii) 
the percentage of plan participants selecting that option type, and (iii) the percentage of 
total plan assets held in that option type.  For instance, 58.93% of plan options in the 
sample are U.S. Domestic equity funds, which represented 65.82% of the investment 
positions held by the average plan participant and 65.19% of the total assets invested 
across the plan sample.  There are three things of particular note about these statistics.  
First, U.S. Domestic equity represents the dominant asset class, easily exceeding the 
combined allocations to the other alternatives.  Second, while there is a significant 
representation of both privately and publicly managed funds in the plan option sample, 
the latter appear to represent the largest portion of the available investment choices by a 
ratio of about two to one (e.g., 57.17% to 27.84%).  Finally, the vast majority of plan 
assets offered and invested in fall within the active management classification, but a 
larger proportion of privately managed funds are passively invested. 
 
3.2  Defining the Plan Investment Option Sample 
For the purpose of analyzing the comparative performance of plan and non-plan 
investment options, the most vital pieces of information contained in our data base are the 
identity of the fund choices offered to plan participants, as well as the performance of 
those options over time.  While we have monthly returns for all funds, the composition of 
each plan was available less frequently.  Specifically, given the constraints imposed by 
size and complexity of the data involved, we were able to obtain this information on four 
distinct occasions: namely, at the beginning of January 2000; July 2002; January 2005; 
and July 2007.  This pattern of observations leads naturally to dividing the full 90-month 
sample period (i.e., January 2000-June 2007) into three non-overlapping 30-month sub-
periods: (i) January 2000-June 2002, (ii) July 2002-December 2004, and (iii) January 
2005-June 2007. 
                                                 
12  More formally, an institutionally managed (i.e., private) account is defined as any plan option that is not 
available to retail investors in the form of a public mutual fund or closed-end fund.  While investment 
managers can provide both private and public versions of the same portfolio strategy, the management of 
these options may differ in material ways, such as portfolio turnover and rebalancing policies.  However, 
the institutionally managed account will typically have lower fees due to the economies of scale related to a 
larger investment position and relationship with the plan sponsor in a single account rather than in large 
numbers of retail accounts.  In addition, it is seldom the case that a plan sponsor will include as options in 
the same plan the public and private version of the same portfolio for a given manager.  
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  The descriptive information summarized in Table 1 showed that the defined 
contribution pension industry grew substantially during the overall sample period.  Of 
course, with this growth the nature and quality of the options offered to plan participants 
may have changed as well.  Accordingly, we created three distinct plan option samples to 
coincide with each of the 30-month sub-periods.  Notice that for any of the sub-periods, 
we are able to identify which plan options were available both at the beginning and at the 
end of the investment horizon (e.g., for the January 2000-June 2002 period, we know the 
funds offered to plan participants on January 1, 2000 and June 30, 2002).  Thus, it is 
possible to establish each plan option sub-sample using either the beginning-of-period or 
end-of-period collection of funds. 
  Each approach has advantages and disadvantages.  The end-of-period method allows 
for an evaluation of funds that sponsors may have added as investable options during the 
interval, but also ignores the possibility that poor performing funds available from the 
outset were dropped prior to the ending date.  Unfortunately, this creates a potential look-
ahead bias in two ways: (i) funds added to a plan option roster after a period of superior 
performance will not be included in the non-plan sample; and (ii) funds initially available 
to plan participants but then removed after a period of inferior performance will not be 
included in the plan option sample.  Alternatively, defining the plan option sample based 
on the beginning-of-period approach avoids the look-ahead bias problem, but potentially 
misstates the selection skills of sponsors by ignoring the additions and deletions they 
make during the interval. 
  In the empirical analysis described below, we calculate performance metrics for plan 
option samples defined using both approaches, a procedure that allows for an explicit 
evaluation of the extent to which a look-ahead bias problem exists.  However, to be the 
most conservative in our judgments about plan sponsor selection skills, we adopt the 
beginning-of-period definition as our primary method for forming the plan option sample.  
Thus, unless otherwise noted, throughout the remainder of the paper we report findings 
based on this approach. 
 
3.3  Defining the Non-Plan Investment Option Sample 
In order to compare the quality of the plan option decisions made by our sponsor sample, 
we also constructed a collection of non-plan options.  That is, at the beginning of each 
sub-period (i.e., January 2000, July 2002 and January 2005), we constructed a  
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representative set of investment alternatives that sponsors could have included in their 
plans, but chose not to.  Since we did not have access to information concerning all of the 
private management options that sponsors may have considered before rejecting them, 
our non-plan option sample consists exclusively of publicly available mutual funds that 
were not included in any of the defined contribution plans for which Fidelity Employer 
Services Company served as a fiduciary during the sample period.  Further, to help 
manage the scope of the analysis, we only considered mutual funds with a U.S. equity-
oriented objective. 
  To accomplish these objectives, on each selection date, we screened the entire mutual 
fund database maintained by Morningstar, Inc., an independent provider of investment 
research services, for all U.S. domestic equity funds that were available for purchase by 
retail customers.  To insure that each potential non-plan fund truly followed an equity 
investment mandate, we imposed the additional inclusion criteria that it produced a 
coefficient of determination of at least 75% when its returns were evaluated by a multi-
risk factor model.  (The various forms of this return-generating model are described in 
the next section.)  We then isolated those funds that did not also show up on the list of 
plan options available in the sponsor sample.  Only those funds that did not appear on the 
beginning-of-period plan option list for a given performance measurement horizon were 
included in the final non-plan option sample.
13,14  Morningstar also provided monthly net-
of-fee returns for these funds, along with various other data concerning the funds’ 
relevant characteristics (e.g., investment objective, style class). 
 
4.  The Quality of Plan Option Selections: Testable Hypotheses and Methodology 
4.1  Testable Hypotheses 
The underlying motivation for this study is to investigate formally the quality of the 
investment options that sponsors offer to participants in defined contribution plans.   
                                                 
13  It is entirely possible that some of the funds included in our non-plan option sample were available 
choices in other defined contribution plans for which Fidelity Employer Services Company was not the 
record-keeper.  However, this possibility does not conflict with the fact these funds were not selected as 
options by the sponsors that we actually investigate.  Consequently, there is no overlap between the 
investment options we placed in our plan and non-plan samples. 
14   When the plan option sample is alternatively defined by the end-of-period approach, the non-plan 
option sample consists of those publicly available mutual funds in the Morningstar database that did not 
show up as a plan choice at any point during the sub-period in question.  Again, this procedure creates a 
possible look-ahead bias by not allowing funds that were either added or removed as plan options during 
the sub-period to enter the non-plan option sample.  
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Specifically, we propose to analyze whether the choices that sponsors do select are 
superior to those that they do not.  The literature provides some evidence on both sides of 
the question of whether fiduciaries in this broadly defined institutional environment do 
possess meaningful manager selection skills.  On one hand, Parwada and Faff (2005) 
studied investment management mandates in the defined benefit pension market and 
found that those mandates were substantially more likely to be awarded to managers 
exhibiting superior past performance relative to their peers.  Thus, given the tendency for 
asset manager performance to persist in the mutual fund industry (e.g., Grinblatt and 
Titman (1992), Brown and Goetzmann (1995)), it is reasonable to expect that the options 
provided to plan participants might represent a superior set of investment choices.  On the 
other hand, Goyal and Wahal (2008) showed that defined benefit plan sponsors who 
follow a “return chasing” strategy of hiring (terminating) investment managers following 
periods of abnormally good (poor) performance do not deliver superior excess returns 
subsequently.  Additionally, Carhart (1997) showed that apparent persistence in mutual 
fund performance is likely to be an artifact of a misspecified model of return 
expectations.  What is unclear, however, is which side of this argument best describes the 
nature of the defined contribution pension industry.  Accordingly, the debate frames the 
following testable hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  The investment options that defined contribution plan sponsors offer to 
participants produce superior risk-adjusted returns relative to otherwise comparable 
options that are not selected for the plan. 
 
  As described in the previous section, defined contribution plan sponsors offer 
participants options that are managed on both a passive (i.e., indexed) and active basis.  
While the we do not address the “passive vs. active” management debate directly—see, 
for instance, Bogle (1998)—it is relevant to consider whether the actively managed 
options offered in a plan have superior investment characteristics relative to those active 
funds the sponsor did not select.  Since there is substantial evidence that active fund 
managers exhibit genuine proficiency in security selection (e.g., Chen, Jegadeesh, and 
Wermers (2000), Baker, Litov, Wachter, and Wurgler (2010)), the question becomes 
whether plan sponsors are able to identify and select those skillful managers (and avoid 
those that are not) when creating the menu of plan options.  Similarly, although both the  
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nature of the investment problem and the tighter fee structures make it less likely that 
indexed products will exhibit significant differences from one another (e.g., Guedj and 
Huang (2009)), it is still interesting to consider whether passively managed plan options 
outperform comparable non-plan ones.  Thus, two additional hypotheses that we test are: 
  
Hypothesis 2:  The actively managed investment options that plan sponsors offer to 
participants produce superior risk-adjusted returns relative to otherwise comparable 
actively managed options that are not selected for the plan. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  The passively managed investment options that plan sponsors offer to 
participants produce superior risk-adjusted returns relative to otherwise comparable 
passively managed options that are not selected for the plan.  
 
  Finally, the statistics presented in Table 1 also indicated that a number of the options 
that plan sponsors offer are managed in private investment vehicles as opposed to 
publicly available funds.  Although there is limited extant evidence on the topic, studies 
such as Coggin, Fabozzi, and Rahman (1993) and Christopherson, Ferson, and Glassman 
(1998) provide mixed findings on whether private defined benefit pension managers are 
able to produce superior investment performance.  Nevertheless, there are several a priori 
reasons to expect that there might be differences in the returns generate by private 
managers and public funds operating in otherwise identical investment environments.  In 
particular, the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration (1998) notes that private 
managers typically charge measurably lower fees (e.g., a difference of 50 basis points per 
annum), owing largely to the lower account servicing expenses they incur by managing 
the assets of a single client rather the voluminous number of commingled accounts that 
describe the typical public mutual fund.  Further, it is also likely that managers of 
privately negotiated accounts will have more predictable fund inflows from participant 
salary contributions, which in turn could lead to lower liquidity costs (i.e., “cash drag”) in 
the on-going management of the invested capital.  Finally, it is possible that private 
managers face a markedly different set of investment restrictions than those imposed on 
managers in the public fund market and that these differences could affect investment 
performance (e.g., Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004)).  The net effect of 
these discrepancies leads to the following prediction:  
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Hypothesis 4:  The privately managed investment options that plan sponsors offer to 
participants produce superior risk-adjusted returns relative to otherwise comparable 
publicly managed options. 
 
4.2  Measuring Abnormal Investment Performance 
To compare the relative investment performance for our samples of plan and non-plan 
options, we estimate several versions of the following four-factor risk model adapted 
from Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997): 
 
 (Rjt-RFt) = j + bj1(Rmt-RFt) + bj2SMBt + bj3HMLt + bj4MOMt + jt   (1) 
 
where, for each month t, (Rjt-RFt) and (Rmt-RFt) are the excess returns to the j-th 
investment option and the market portfolio, respectively; SMB is the difference in returns 
between portfolios of small and large capitalization firms; HML is the difference in 
returns between portfolios of stocks with the highest and lowest book-to-market ratios; 
and MOM is the difference between the returns to portfolios of stocks with the largest 
and smallest returns during the previous 11 months (see Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) for 
the motivation for including price momentum effects).
15  Specifically, within a given time 
horizon, we estimate three different  (i.e., alpha) coefficients for each plan and non-plan 
investment alternative using: (i) a one-factor version of equation (1) with (Rmt-RFt) as the 
independent variable; (ii) a three-factor version with (Rmt-RFt), SMB, and HML; and (iii) 
the full four-factor version.  Consistent with our sample formation process, we calculated 
risk-adjusted performance statistics over the January 2000-June 2002, July 2002-
December 2004, and January 2005-June 2007 sub-periods.  The first of these intervals is 
particularly notable in that it almost exactly coincides with the timing of a significant 
downturn in global equity markets.  We also examine behavior over the complete January 
2000-June 2007 period by combining the respective risk-adjusted performance measures 
from the three sub-periods into a single comprehensive sample. 
  Finally, we imposed two additional conditions on the empirical analysis.  First, given 
the nature of the risk model and the non-plan option sample we employ, we only 
                                                 
15  The factor return data required for the estimation of equation (1) were obtained from Ken French and 
Eugene Fama via the website http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.   
This website also contains a more detailed description of how the Rm, SMB, HML, and MOM variables 
were constructed.  
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calculated alphas for those plan options that followed a U.S. domestic equity mandate.  
Thus, we do not address in the study the quality of the fixed-income or cash-equivalent 
options that plan sponsors chose.  Second, in order to generate equivalent sample sizes 
for each of the three forms of the risk factor model used to calculate alphas, the R
2 
inclusion rule described earlier for building the non-plan option comparison sample was 
based on the three-factor version only.
16   
 
5.  The Quality of Plan Option Selections: Empirical Results 
5.1  Full Sample Results 
In assessing the quality of the plan options that sponsors offer to their defined 
contribution plan participants, there are two questions that need to be addressed.  First, 
does the total set of potential plan options from which sponsors make their ultimate menu 
selections produce returns that meet or exceed expectations?  Second, do the funds that 
sponsors actually include in their plans outperform funds that were not selected?  While 
answering the second question is the primary focus of this investigation, it is also useful 
to consider whether plan participants are being well served on an absolute basis as well as 
a relative one, allowing for plan fees. 
 
5.1.1 In-Sample Alpha Difference Tests 
The first two panels of Table 2 list three different investment performance summary 
statistics for various parts of the full sample of potential equity-oriented plan options: (i) 
the mean alpha, (ii) the median alpha, and (iii) the percentage of positive alphas within 
the respective sample stratification.  Alphas are tabulated separately for each form of the 
factor model discussed above and differences in the performance statistics between plan 
and non-plan options, as well as p-values indicating the statistical significance of those 
differentials, are also reported.
17  (Notice in this display that we refer to these 
performance statistics as “in-sample” alphas, which highlights the fact they are measured 
over the same time period used to estimate the risk parameters themselves; the distinction 
                                                 
16  We have also produced a full set of the findings discussed in the next section using the three different 
non-plan option samples that result from applying the “R
2 > 0.75” inclusion rule independently to each of 
the three versions of equation (1).  Although this procedure generated slightly different non-plan sample 
sizes, it had no appreciable impact on the reported outcomes; these findings are available upon request. 
17  The mean alpha differential test was conducted as a standard difference-in-means t-test, adjusting for the 
unequal sizes of the plan and non-plan sub-samples.  The median alpha differential tests were conducted 
using the Mann-Whitney procedure.  The (% Pos.) differential test was conducted as a chi-squared test on 
the difference in proportions in two samples.  
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between in-sample and out-of-sample performance measures will be clear in the next 
section.)  Panel A analyzes sponsor selection skill over the full 90-month sample period 
while Panel B provides a breakdown of performance during each 30-month sub-period. 
  The mean alpha statistics for the total sample of potential plan options shown in Panel 
A suggest that factor model selection does appear to matter.  In particular, there is a 
sizeable gap between the average monthly alphas generated by the one-factor market 
model (i.e., -2.75 basis points) and the three- and four-factors versions of the Fama-
French model (i.e., -11.32 and -10.91 basis points, respectively).  Comparable gaps exist 
for the other two alpha summary statistics, suggesting that the one-factor risk model may 
be setting return expectations too low relative to the true level of risk that exists within 
the set of equity funds from which plan sponsors could choose.  Regardless of the model 
specification, however, both the mean and median alpha statistics are negative and that 
the proportion of potential plans producing a positive alpha never exceeds 40%.  This 
implies that the overall set of potential plan options generated returns that fell short of 
expectations, but it is interesting to note that the level of annualized shortfall is within the 
range of the funds’ expense ratios, which the Pension and Welfare Benefits 
Administration (1998) showed could range as high as 133 basis points per year for 
defined contribution plan options.  Further, these findings are also consistent with the 
percentage of all retail mutual funds that are capable of producing positive alphas relative 
to a multi-factor risk model (see, for instance, Harlow and Brown (2006)).  
  Putting concerns about the quality of the potential investable universe aside, the more 
relevant issue involves examining the difference in the alphas generated by the set of 
alternatives that sponsors chose compared to those they did not.  In this regard, the 
evidence in Panel A appears to be quite persuasive.  For each factor model, plan sponsors 
consistently selected funds that produced, on average, the largest risk-adjusted returns.  
For example, using the three-factor model to describe return expectations, the mean 
monthly in-sample alpha for the set of actual plan options was 9.61 basis points higher 
than that for the non-plan sample, which translates into a compounded annual advantage of 
1.22%.  This outcome was confirmed by the other factor model variations—particularly 
the four-factor model that accounts for return momentum effects—and, to a modestly 
reduced extent, by the median alpha differential statistics.  Additionally, the significant 
difference in the (% Pos.) measure (e.g., 44.36% vs. 34.78% for the three-factor model)  
  18
indicates that this mean alpha advantage is not being driven by a few outliers.   
Consequently, these data represent an initial indication that plan sponsors may possess 
selection skills that allow them to discriminate among the best set of available investment 
options when determining the menu of choices from which their participants will invest. 
  The sub-period breakdown shown in Panel B of Table 2 produces a similar picture.  
In all three 30-month intervals, the plan option sample outperforms the non-plan sample 
on a risk-adjusted basis irrespective of which metric is used.  This performance advantage 
is particularly strong during the general equity market decline that occurred in the first 
sub-interval (i.e., January 2000-June 2002), which suggests that plan sponsors may be 
especially good at selecting funds that control downside risk on a relative basis.  This 
notion is corroborated by the fact that more than three out five of the plan options during 
this period beat expectations (i.e., (% Pos.) coefficients ranging from 59.72% to 65.39%), 
whereas no more than about 50% of the non-plan funds were able to do the same.   
However, given that the mean and median alpha differentials were significantly positive 
in the other sub-periods, it also appears that sponsors were capable of selecting funds that 
outperformed in rising markets as well.  Collectively, then, these findings provide 
considerable support for our first hypothesis.
18 
 
5.1.2 Alternative Aggregation & Out-of-Sample Alpha Tests 
The preceding analysis strongly suggests the relative outperformance of the plan option 
sample, but it is possible that the experimental design influenced that outcome.  In 
particular, there are two initial areas of possible concern.  First, our method of 
aggregating alpha statistics across the entire sample period is but one of several 
techniques that could have been employed.  Second, as noted, these risk-adjusted 
performance statistics were estimated simultaneously with the factor model on which 
                                                 
18 Recall that, to avoid a look-ahead bias, a fund was only included in the plan option sample if it was 
available to participants from the beginning of the sample period.  This inclusion procedure has the 
potential of understating the advantage of plan options over non-plan options if plan sponsors are skillful in 
adjusting the set of options offered during the investment horizon.  To evaluate this possibility, we 
replicated the results of the entire study with an end-of-period inclusion criterion.  This adjustment had a 
material effect on the sizes of the plan option and non-plan option samples, but did not change any of the 
findings at a qualitative level.  For instance, with respect to the findings reported in Panel A of Table 2 for 
the overall sample period, the end-of-period plan option sample had 2,028 observations (compared to 1,488 
using the beginning-of-period criterion).  Further, the difference in the mean alpha reported for the one-, 
three- and four-factor models were 0.0684, 0.1058 and 0.1099, respectively, all of which are statistically 
significant and larger than their beginning-of-sample counterparts.  Thus, while the skill level exhibited by 
plan sponsors is apparent even with the more conservative beginning-of-period specification, their true 
prowess in selecting plan options might be somewhat larger still.  
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they were based.  To address these issues in a separate robustness test, we implemented 
an alternative methodological approach designed to produce out-of-sample estimates of 
abnormal performance and then aggregate the cross section of those statistics in a 
different manner.  Specifically, we employed the following procedure, which can be 
viewed as a modified form of the Fama-MacBeth (1973) two-stage approach: 
 
1.  For each plan and non-plan option j, we estimated the set of factor loadings {bjkt} 
for various forms of equation (1) as of month t using the most recent 30 months of 
return data (e.g., in June 2002, model parameters were estimated using data from 
January 2000-June 2002); 
2.  These estimated loadings were used in conjunction with the actual factor returns 
in month t+1 to create an estimate for the expected return to the j-th option in 
month t+1 (i.e., E(Rjt+1)); 
3.  The out-of-sample estimate of abnormal performance for option j in month t+1 
was then calculated by differing that option’s actual and expected returns, or  1 jt    
= Rjt+1 - E(Rjt+1); 
4.  The first three steps were repeated for each month between July 2002 (i.e., the 
first month for which  j    can be estimated) and June 2007 by rolling the 30-
month estimation window forward one month at a time.  For each available plan 
and non-plan option, this procedure created as many as 60 separate monthly  j    
forecasts, depending on data availability; 
5.  For both the plan and non-plan option samples, separate month T forecasts of the 
aggregate abnormal performance—call them  PT  
 and  NPT   —were created as 
equally weighted portfolios of the available options in each respective sample.  
The month T difference between the aggregated out-of-sample alpha forecasts in 
the plan and non-plan samples (i.e., [ PT  
-  NPT   ]) was computed for each of the 
60 months between July 2002-June 2007; and 
6.  We then tested for the statistical significance of the mean, median, and proportion 
of positive values in the set of 60 monthly values for [ PT  
-  NPT   ].
19  
                                                 
19   To minimize the impact of outliers in this relatively small set of observations, we Winsorized the data 
distribution at the 90% level (i.e., the bottom (top) three observations in the rank-ordered distribution were 
set equal to the fourth-from-bottom (-top) observation) before performing the mean value significance test.  
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  Panel C of Table 2 summarizes the results, which are once again reported separately 
for the one-, three- and four-factor versions of the underlying risk model.  In general, 
these aggregated findings corroborate the conclusion that the investment options chosen 
by plan sponsors produce superior net-of-expense, risk-adjusted returns.  The overall 
mean of the 60 cross-sectional values of [ PT  
-  NPT   ] ranged from 6.40 basis points per 
month (for the three-factor model) to 6.53 basis points (for the one-factor model), with all 
three average out-of-sample alpha differential estimates being highly statistically reliable.  
Additionally, the median values of these alpha differential distributions tell a similar, if 
somewhat attenuated, story in terms of both the directional effect and significance. 
  Perhaps an even more telling indication of the performance advantage enjoyed by the 
plan option sample over the non-plan option sample is the percentage of the 60 
aggregated alpha differentials that were positive.  Specifically, regardless of which form 
of equation (1) was used to forecast risk-adjusted performance, the portfolio of 
investment options chosen by plan sponsors produced a larger alpha value than the 
comparable non-plan alpha in roughly seven out of 10 cases.  Further, the reported p-
values indicate that each of these (% Pos.) alpha differential statistics exceeds its null 
hypothesis level of 50% by a reliable margin.  Thus, the findings in Panel C make it 
unlikely that those in Panels A and B are a spurious artifact of how risk-adjusted 
performance was calculated or accumulated over time. 
 
5.2 Factor-Matching Tests 
While the difference tests in Table 2 summarize several aspects of how the typical plan 
and non-plan funds performed over the sample period, there may be other important 
cross-sectional differences in these samples that are “averaged out” by the empirical 
design.  For instance, despite the fact that all of the plan and non-plan returns were risk-
adjusted using the same multi-factor model, there is a chance that the two samples load 
differently on the various risk factors.  If this is indeed the case, any imprecision in 
measuring either the factor betas for a particular investment option or the overall levels of 
the factors themselves could manifest as an unintended difference in the reported alphas. 
  To guard against this possibility, we performed two additional robustness tests 
comparing the performance of the plan and non-plan samples using a more precise 
method of matching investment options by their factor exposures.  First, we sort all of the  
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plan options (1,488 observations) and non-plan options (9,048 observations) into risk 
factor “bins” and assess the relative performance of each subgroup.  In the second test, 
we match each plan option with a specific non-plan “nearest neighbor” according the 
similarity of their respective factor exposures and then calculate the risk-adjusted return 
differentials of those matched pairs.  Each of these robustness tests was conducted using 
the in-sample performance statistics described earlier. 
 
5.2.1  Factor Bin  Sorts 
We placed every investment option in each sample division into one of 16 distinct factor-
matched bins according to whether its beta exposures from the four-factor version of 
equation (1) fell above or below the median value for the entire sample.  For example, an 
option included in a plan having an above-median (Rm-RF) beta, below-median SMB 
beta, below-median HML beta, and above-median MOM beta would be placed in the 
[High (Rm-RF), Low SMB, Low HML, High MOM] factor-matched bin within the plan 
option sample.
20  After filling each bin in this manner for both investment option types, 
we then calculated the bin-specific mean alpha, median alpha, and (% Pos. Alpha) 
performance statistics, as well as the differences in those respective values between the 
plan and non-plan samples. For the purpose of this sorting procedure, factor betas were 
measured over the entire 90-month sample period. 
  Panel A of Table 3 lists the frequencies and risk-adjusted performance differentials 
for each of the sixteen factor-match bins.  Notice that the plan and non-plan options 
appear to sort in a roughly similar manner.  This can be seen in the seventh column of the 
display, which reports the ratio of the number of plan options to the number of non-plan 
options that occur in a particular bin.  Using the total sample ratio of 16.59% (i.e., 1,488 
÷ 9,048) as the expected frequency in each bin, the chi-square statistic testing for bin 
uniformity is 11.22, which has an associated p-value of only 0.7369.  Still, the bin 
frequency range of 10.57% to 23.86% indicates some amount of dispersion in how the 
extreme observations in these samples are divided.  For the four bins with the largest 
relative concentrations of plan options, three have low SMB exposures, three have low 
                                                 
20  Due to correlation among the factor loadings, it is unlikely that this sorting procedure will ever produce 
bins of equal size in any given sample.  That is, if low-SMB beta options in the non-plan sample also tend 
to have low MOM factor exposures, the [Low SMB, Low MOM] bins will be more heavily populated than 
the [High SMB, High MOM] bins.  Thus, this sorting method controls for differences that may exist in the 
factor loading patterns of the plan and non-plan samples.  
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HML exposures, and three have high MOM exposures.  However, the broad nature of the 
sorting routine we employ makes it impossible to infer if these strategic outcomes were 
an intentional part of the sponsors’ selection process or merely a statistical consequence. 
  Whether using the mean or median, the alpha difference statistics show a remarkable 
degree of consistency across the 16 factor-matched bins.  In fact, all but one of the bin-
specific differentials for both performance measures are positive, and they are statistically 
significant at the 5% level in nine (mean alpha) and 13 (median alpha) cases, 
respectively.  (The mean alpha differential in the [High, High, High, Low] bin is 
insignificantly negative.)  Further, notice that the respective sample-wide weighted 
averages for these statistics match of exceed the 8.0 - 9.5 basis point values reported for 
their in-sample, equally weighted counterparts using the four-factor risk model in Table 
2.  Additionally, the next-to-last column of Table 3 shows that the plan option sample 
produced a higher percentage of positive alphas than the non-plan sample in 13 of the 16 
bins.  Taken together, these factor-matched findings once again provide strong 
confirmation regarding the investment superiority of the plan option sample and allow us 
to state more confidently that the selection skills demonstrated by plan sponsors are not 
confined to—or driven by—a limited number of factor-related investment strategies. 
 
5.2.2  Matched-Pair Analysis 
A different way of performing this factor-matching comparison is to pair each plan 
option with its single most comparable alternative in the non-plan sample, where these 
“nearest neighbors” are defined by the proximity of their respective risk exposures.  An 
advantage of this refinement is that it offers a better measure of the potential opportunity 
cost imposed on the plan participant by the sponsor’s selection process.  That is, for a 
participant who has committed to investing a portion of his retirement portfolio assets 
into an equity fund with a given set of risk characteristics, the cost of the being limited to 
the options provided by the sponsor is the incremental return foregone by not being able 
to invest in the non-plan option with the most similar factor profile.  Accordingly, our 
analysis focuses on the risk-adjusted return differentials produced across the entire 
matched pair sample. 
  To accomplish this, we matched all plan options in the sample with a specific non-
plan option as follows.  Starting with a randomly selected plan option, we searched the  
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non-plan option sample for the fund that minimized the sum of the absolute values of the 
differences in the factor loadings computed by equation (1).  That is, the nearest neighbor 
was the non-plan option that satisfied: 


4
1 i
plan - non i, plan i,   ) b    -   (b   min   .  (2) 
Repeating this process for all 1,488 plan options—which entailed approximately 13.5 
million (i.e., 1,488 x 9,048) comparisons —yielded the final collection of factor-matched 
pairs.
21  For each pairing, a risk-adjusted return differential was then computed by 
subtracting the estimated in-sample alpha for the non-plan neighbor from its counterpart 
in the plan option sample.  
  Panel B of Table 3 reports several statistics associated with these matched-pair return 
differentials, including the mean value, the percentage of positive differences (i.e., j.plan 
>  j,non-plan neighbor), and various values defining the frequency distribution.  Separate 
findings are shown for the entire sample period as well as each of the three sub-periods.  
Overall, the findings once again confirm that the investment options selected by plan 
sponsors produced returns that were superior to those generated by otherwise comparable 
funds that were not chosen.  Both the mean and median alpha differentials are positive in 
all of the various time horizons (e.g., 7.26 and 2.35 basis points per month, respectively, 
for the January 2000-June 2002 sub-period).  While these reported alpha differential 
values are somewhat reduced relative to when the plan option sample was compared to 
the entire non-option sample, this more severe way of controlling for risk still produces 
statistically and economically significant levels of outperformance. 
   Further, the fact that the mean alpha differential exceeds the median value in each 
period implies that the matched-pair return distribution is positively skewed, suggesting 
that sponsors were able to include a disproportionate share of big “winners”—or avoid 
the inclusion of big “losers”—among their plan option menus.  This skewness is also 
indicated by alpha differentials at each percentile break above the median exceeding (in 
absolute terms) their corresponding values below the median to differing degrees (e.g., 
                                                 
21   Two other details of this matching process are worth noting.  First, the sequential selection of nearest 
neighbors from the non-plan option sample was done with replacement, which eliminated the possibility 
that the results could be influenced by where the selection procedure started in the plan option sample.  
Second, we also repeated the entire matching process using a variation of equation (2) that minimized the 
sum of the squared deviations in plan and non-plan factor loadings.  This alternative procedure produced no 
material difference in the findings relative to those reported in Panel B of Table 3.  
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for the entire sample period, the respective observations at the 75
th and 25
th percentiles 
are 12.95 and -5.50 basis points, whereas the absolute gap between 33.52 and -23.64 
basis points at the 90
th and 10
th percentiles is considerably wider).  Finally, and perhaps 
most telling, more than three in five (e.g., 61.76% in the full sample period) of the plan 
options generated higher risk-adjusted returns than their factor-matched nearest neighbors 
in the non-plan sample.  This is a strong indication that plan sponsors were consistently 
able to select plan options that “covered” their net-of-fee opportunity costs, as measured 
by the return produced by their matched pairs.  The reported p-values in the last column 
of the display, which are calculated relative to an expected value of 50%, indicate that 
these comparisons are statistically meaningful across all three sub-periods as well in the 
overall time frame.   
 
5.3  Active vs. Passive Management Results  
To help establish the source of the apparent return differential enjoyed by plan funds, 
Table 4 refines the analysis of the preceding section by focusing on the set of actively 
managed funds maintained within the total investable option universe.  As in Table 2, 
Panels A and B of this new exhibit examines in-sample risk-adjusted returns during the 
entire period and three sub-periods, respectively, while Panel C reports findings for the 
modified Fama-MacBeth aggregation procedure using out-of-sample alpha forecasts.   
Notice once again that the vast majority of the funds in both the total universe (10,368 of 
10,536) and plan option (1,350 of 1,488) samples are indeed actively managed.  Thus, it 
is not surprising that the differences in mean and median alphas generated by active plan 
and non-plan options are quite similar to those reported for the entire sample.  Despite 
this fact, it does appear to be the case that those differentials are slightly larger in the 
active sample than for the corresponding measures in the overall sample.  For instance, 
the mean three-factor monthly alpha differences for the active and total samples were 
9.86 and 9.61 basis points, respectively.  Further, the ability of plan sponsors to 
discriminate among funds able to beat return expectations appears to be greater as well; 
the difference in the (% Pos.) statistic between the plan and non-plan options using the 
three-factor model is 11.14% for active funds versus 9.58% for all funds.  This pattern is 
reflected across all factor model variations, as well as in each of the shorter intervals 
included in the sub-period analysis shown in Panel B.  Further, the out-of-sample alpha 
analysis in Panel C confirms the pattern of plan option superiority for the 60 monthly  
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cross sections.  Thus, consistent with our second hypothesis, we conclude that the 
actively managed funds that sponsors select for their plans do outperform the set of non-
plan options, after controlling for both risk and fees. 
  It is also possible that the passively managed investment alternatives offered to plan 
participants outperform those that sponsors considered but rejected.  While quite mixed, 
the findings reported in Table 5 ultimately suggest that this is not likely to be true.   
However, considerable caution is warranted when drawing any definitive conclusions due 
to the substantially smaller sample sizes—particularly for the non-plan index fund 
sample—involved in the analysis.  For the entire sample period (Panel A), the difference 
in mean in-sample alphas between plan and non-plan passively managed funds is actually 
negative for the three- and four-factor models (i.e., -3.42 and -3.11 basis points, 
respectively) although neither differential was meaningfully different from zero.  The 
sub-period results listed in Panel B confirm the insignificance of these performance 
differentials over time.  Further, index funds included as plan options were typically able 
to produce returns that meet or exceed expectations about 25% of the time.  If nothing 
else, this underscores the effect that expenses have on investment products that follow a 
passive mandate.  On the other hand, the out-of-sample alpha differential findings in 
Panel C vary greatly by factor model they do suggest a positive and meaningful 
separation in performance between plan and non-plan passive funds that favors the 
former when the multi-factor return-generating models are used.  
  The overall inference that can be drawn from the combined results listed in Table 4 
and Table 5 is that sponsors do appear to be adept at selecting actively managed funds to 
offer to participants in their defined contribution plans, but that they show no consistently 
demonstrable skills when choosing among the set of available index fund alternatives.  
Accordingly, in addition to finding support for our second hypothesis, we also reject our 
third proposition that the passively managed plan funds produce better risk-adjusted 
returns than otherwise comparable non-plan index funds.  This might not be an 
unexpected outcome: the potential value added to the plan participant in having sponsors 
spend their time analyzing active funds rather than passive ones is undoubtedly greater.
22  
Based on this evidence, we can therefore narrow our earlier conclusion regarding the 
                                                 
22  This view is also consistent with the model of the money management industry developed in Berk and 
Green (2004), who demonstrate the benefits that obtain to rational active portfolio managers who possess 
superior information gathering and assessment skills.  
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superior fund selection skills of the sponsors in our sample to include just those potential 
plan options that have an active management mandate. 
 
6.  The Plan Option Sample: Cross-Sectional Differences 
Given the advantage in risk-adjusted performance documented for the subset of actively 
managed plan options, it is useful to consider some possible determinants of this result.  
One potentially important structural difference that exists within the plan option sample is 
that some of the funds are managed in private institutional accounts while others are run 
as public mutual funds.  Other potential factors that might be associated with this 
performance differential include the total market value of participant assets invested in 
the option, the number of plans that offer a particular option, and the number of 
participants that hold a particular investment option in their portfolios. 
 
6.1  Public vs. Privately Managed Plan Options  
Hypothesis 4 stated that managers of privately held accounts would generate superior 
risk-adjusted returns relative to otherwise comparable public funds, due to the ex ante 
advantages they enjoy (e.g., lower expenses, more predictable cash inflows).  To test this 
supposition formally, Table 6 reports statistics summarizing the alpha differentials 
between the privately and publicly managed funds constituting the set of actively 
managed plan options.  For the sake of brevity, the display only lists findings for the 
entire sample period, but pools the risk-adjusted performance statistics in three different 
ways: (i) equally weighted abnormal returns, (ii) participant-weighted abnormal returns, 
and (iii) plan asset-weighted abnormal returns.  As before, both in-sample alphas and out-
of-sample aggregated alpha differentials are calculated for the public and private active 
plan option subsamples.
23 
  Panel A shows the set of performance measures pooled on an equally weighted basis.  
This portfolio formation method implicitly assigns the same level of importance to each 
plan option regardless of the degree to which participants actually invest in it or the size 
of the plan in which it is included.  The in-sample alpha results (Panel A.1) indicate little 
                                                 
23   For the out-of-sample alpha differentials, the three ways of pooling risk-adjusted performance affected 
the way in which the monthly cross-sectional portfolios were formed (i.e., Step 5 of the modified Fama-
MacBeth procedure in Section 5.1.2 was replicated using participant-weighted and asset-weighted 
portfolios in addition to equally weighted ones.)  
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difference in performance between actively managed private and public funds.  In fact, 
the three- and four-factor versions of equation (1) lead to insignificant average 
performance differentials of approximately minus one basis point per month, with only 
modest differences in the (% Pos.) variable.  Conversely, the one-factor model produces a 
slightly positive (although insignificant) performance advantage for the public funds over 
private managers.  The out-of-sample aggregated alpha differential results (Panel A.2)—
particularly the mean and (% Pos.) statistics—do indicate a slight positive performance 
increment generated by privately managed accounts.  However, most of these alpha 
differentials remain statistically insignificant.  Thus, the evidence in Panel A does not 
provide strong support for an investment advantage enjoyed by either management type 
and, as such, fails to support the final hypothesis we investigate regarding the superiority 
of privately managed accounts. 
  In fact, if the performance statistics are tabulated on the basis of how the typical plan 
participant actually allocates within the plan (Panel B) or how the total plan assets are 
allocated across the entire sample (Panel C), the preponderance of the evidence appears 
to be more consistent with the alternative story that mutual fund managers produce 
slightly better risk-adjusted returns than private managers.  For example, when either 
multi-factor version of the risk model is employed to calculate in-sample alphas (Panels 
B.1 and C.1), the median performance differential in favor of mutual funds is about seven 
basis points per month.  Further, more than half of the public managers produced positive 
alphas, while more than half of the private managers failed to do so (e.g., 58.64% positive 
alphas in mutual funds vs. 42.24% in institutional accounts using the three-factor model 
in the asset-weighted sample).   
  Additionally, both the mean and median out-of-sample alpha differentials (Panels B.2 
and C.2) from the multi-factor versions of equation (1) are positive—with a single 
exception—although at far more modest and insignificant levels.  Generally, slightly 
more than half of these performance differentials are positive (e.g., 56.67% of the 
participant-weighted out-of-sample differentials exceed zero, using the three- and four-
factor models).  Consequently, compared to the mixed evidence generated by the equally 
weighted sample, the participant- and asset-weighted findings suggest that plan 
participants are able to identify the better funds when deciding where they should 
actually invest their money.  Thus, not only do the earlier results indicate that plan  
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sponsors exhibit positive manager selection skills when choosing their plan option 
menus, but it may also be the case the investors who use those menus to allocate their 
retirement savings exhibit positive selection skills of their own. 
  It is tempting on the basis of the findings in the bottom two panels of Table 6 to 
conclude that the typical manager of a public plan fund possesses somewhat elevated 
security skills relative to the typical private plan fund manager.  However, while this 
might be true, there are at least two reasons that argue against that judgment.  First, the 
statistical evidence is not especially strong; in fact, the alpha differentials from the one-
factor model actually contradict that conclusion.
24  Further, even if these performance 
statistics capture legitimate return differentials, it is possible that they merely reflect 
disparities in the operating conditions or investment restrictions imposed on public and 
private accounts, rather than disparate levels of investment prowess.  Although our data 
do not permit us to differentiate between those possibilities directly, it is nonetheless true 
that defined contribution plan participants do not appear to be incrementally benefited by 
their selection of private fund managers, in contrast to the prediction of Hypothesis 4. 
 
6.2 Other Potential Cross-Sectional Influences 
In addition to dissimilarities in the way their assets are managed, the performance 
differentials established for the collection of active plan options might also be associated 
with differences in the way plans are organized.  Three specific factors that define the 
defined contribution universe in our sample are (i) the total market value of participant 
holdings in a particular option across all plans (MKTVAL), (ii) the number of distinct 
plans offering a particular option to their participants (PLANFRQ), and (iii) the number 
of participants across all plans who select a particular option (PARTFRQ).  Given the 
previous findings, it is conceivable that, as a group, sponsors are good at selecting fund 
managers who are able to produce larger risk-adjusted returns.  If so, we would expect a 
greater number of plans to offer the highest-alpha funds to their participants.   
Alternatively, if plan participants are good at determining the best options from the set of 
choices they are offered, we would also expect the better-performing funds to attract 
more assets and more investors. 
                                                 
24  Because the participant- and asset-based pooling methods in Panels B.1 and C.1 represent weighted 
averages, notice that it is only possible to calculate p-values for the mean in-sample alpha difference tests, 
which have been appropriately adjusted for each weighting scheme.  
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  To examine these possibilities, we consider the extent to which the in-sample risk-
adjusted performance measures (ALPHA) for each of the 1,350 actively managed plan 
options are linked to MKTVAL, PLANFRQ, and PARTFRQ.  In particular, we perform 
two final statistical tests.  First, we calculate the Spearman rank correlation coefficients 
between the various combinations of variables.  Second, in order to evaluate the temporal 
stability of the relationships between performance and the three plan organization 
determinants, we divide the sample into terciles by the size of the plan option’s ALPHA 
coefficient and calculate the means for each variable within those cohorts.   We perform 
these analyses over both the entire sample period as well as the three non-overlapping 30-
month sub-periods.  These results are summarized in Table 7.
25 
  As shown in Panel A, none of the three plan-specific variables is particularly highly 
correlated with plan option performance, although the relationships between ALPHA and 
MKTVAL (0.1078) as well as PLANFRQ (0.0886) are positive and statistically reliable 
at conventional levels over the entire sample period.  For MKTVAL, this relationship 
appears to be reasonably stable with positive coefficients occurring in all three sub-
periods, the most recent two of which are also strongly significant.  This suggests that, 
across the entire plan universe, participants tend to put their investment capital into those 
funds producing the best performance.  This conclusion is substantiated by the 
relationship between ALPHA and PARTFRQ, which is consistently positive—indicating 
that more participants tend to invest in the best-performing options—and statistically 
meaningful in the last sub-period.  Conversely, the correlation between ALPHA and 
PLANFRQ is actually negative (although highly insignificant) in the second sub-period, 
so that the strength of the overall relationship is being driven by the most recent 30-
month interval.  Thus, while a greater number of plan sponsors do offer options with the 
largest risk-adjusted returns, this tendency has not been established for as long.
26 
  The cohort evidence in Panel B confirms both the overall direction of these 
connections as well as the relative lack of strength that underlies them.  Specifically, 
                                                 
25   The findings listed in Table 7 are based on risk-adjusted returns defined relative to the four-factor 
version of equation (1).  We have also replicated these tests using alphas from the one- and three-factor 
versions of the risk model and they do not differ in any material way from those reported in the exhibit. 
26   Although not shown in Table 7, we also computed the Spearman rank correlations between MKTVAL, 
PLANFRQ, and PARTFRQ.  Not surprisingly, the two participant-oriented measures were quite highly 
correlated (i.e., (MKTVAL,PARTFRQ) = 0.9491).  The relationship between the sponsor-oriented 
measure and the other two were also significantly positive, although at somewhat more modest levels (i.e., 
(PLANFRQ,MKTVAL) = 0.4170 and (PLANFRQ,PARTFRQ) = 0.4879).  
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viewed across the entire period, the mean ALPHA in the lowest tercile of the sample (i.e., 
-0.3350, or -33.50 basis points per month) is associated with the lowest mean levels for 
all of the other variables: $418.412 (MKTVAL), 512.00 (PLANFRQ), and 28,360 
(PARTFRQ).  However, the reported values for these three characteristics are not 
monotonic across the performance terciles.  In fact, only in the most recent 30-month 
interval is it the case that the largest number of sponsors and participants are associated 
with the best-performing investment options, indicating that in this sub-period sponsors 
selected the best funds as options in their plans and participants picked the best funds 
from among those that they were offered.  On the other hand, the largest concentration of 
sponsor and participant activity never falls in the lowest-alpha terciles, suggesting that 
the vast majority of both groups demonstrate the consistent ability to avoid selecting the 
worst performing funds. 
 
7.  Concluding Comments 
Although the size and scope of the market for retirement assets has fostered a 
considerable amount of research, the vast majority of that literature has been concentrated 
on the portfolio choices that investors make as well as the investment performance 
associated with those decisions.  Of course, the choices that participants make are a direct 
function of the set of alternatives they are offered, but far less is known about the 
motivation and performance of the sponsors who provide those choices.  To help address 
this need, in this paper we posit and test several hypotheses concerning the quality of the 
investment options that sponsors made available to their participants compared to those 
that they did not.  Using a comprehensive and proprietary database maintained by the 
largest service provider in the defined contribution industry, we demonstrate that the 
investment options included in plans outperform an otherwise comparable set of non-plan 
alternatives by an average of 1.22% on an annualized basis, an incremental amount that is 
both net of fees and adjusted for risk.  This performance advantage is (i) spread fairly 
uniformly across equity style classes, (ii) is not particularly sensitive to the nature of the 
risk-adjustment process, and (iii) was present, albeit in different degrees, across all sub-
intervals of the overall sample period.  Further, we show that the sources of this 
outperformance are the actively managed funds that sponsors select and, to a far lesser 
extent, the public fund products they choose, despite the apparent advantages that  
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privately managed accounts appear to enjoy.  We conclude that plan sponsors possess 
genuine selection skills with regard to the menu of investment options they offer to their 
participants. 
  Our analysis also suggests some potentially fruitful directions for future research.  We 
have concentrated on the equity fund selections made by plan sponsors, which is likely to 
be the asset class for which there is the largest possible benefit in deploying superior 
selection skills.  Even so, the same set of hypotheses that we test in this study could be 
applied to fixed-income, cash-equivalent, or even life-cycle and tactical asset allocation 
funds.  Further, it would be interesting to consider how frequently sponsors feel 
compelled to adjust the set of available plan options and what the economic and 
behavioral determinants underlying that decision might be.   
  Beyond that, it is possible that cross-sectional variations in the set of plan options 
offered by sponsoring firms are related to differences in any of several dimensions 
summarizing their corporate profiles (e.g., industry affiliation, market capitalization, 
employee base).  Said differently, do General Electric, Microsoft, and Whole Foods 
Market face comparable decisions when designing their defined contribution plans?  In 
this context, it may be the case the need to hedge labor income risk influences the 
selection process.  Finally, it is likely that managers in the defined contribution market 
are subject to the same sort of agency problems of the type identified by Brown, Harlow, 
and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and it would be useful to consider 
how those incentives might impact performance, particularly with regard to differences 
between funds available to the general public and those accounts that are privately 
managed.  However, inasmuch as all of these issues are well beyond the scope of the 
present investigation, they will be left for future consideration.  
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Table 1 
Summary of Defined Contribution Plan Characteristics 
 
 
This display summarizes various characteristics describing the sample of defined contribution plans for which Fidelity Employer Services Company acted as a 
service provider for the period from January 2000 to June 2007.  Panel A lists year-end statistics regarding the number of sponsors, plans, participants, and 
assets under management in the sample, as well as the distribution of available plan options offered by the sponsors.  Panel B lists percentage allocation 
statistics involving the asset classes and the nature of the fund management (i.e., active vs. passive, private vs. public). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A:  Number of Sponsors, Participants, and Investment Options 
 
 
 
 
Year Ending 
 
 
Number of 
Sponsors 
 
 
Number 
of Plans 
 
 
Total 
Participants 
 
Avg 
Participants 
Per Plan 
 
 
Total Assets 
($ mil) 
 
Avg Assets 
Per Plan 
($ mil) 
 
 
Total Plan 
Options 
 
 
Avg Options 
Per Plan 
 
Max (Min) # of 
Plan Options 
Utilized 
2000  21,460 23,973  8,394,395  350.16  494,754 20.64 315,752 14.71  305  (1) 
2001  22,946 25,653  9,109,671  355.11  493,938 19.25 370,902 16.16  430  (1) 
2002  23,707 26,421  9,581,385  362.64  455,194 17.23 413,818 17.46  471  (1) 
2003  24,053 26,805  9,798,152  365.53  575,574 21.47 448,814 18.66  534  (1) 
2004  24,882  27,764 10,326,808 371.95  661,042 23.81 500,650  20.12  583  (1) 
2005  25,955  29,035 11,212,918 386.19  733,546 25.26 567,111  21.85  656  (1) 
2006  27,359  30,634 12,464,411 406.88  877,412 28.64 635,215  23.22  696  (1) 
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Table 1 (cont.) 
Summary of Defined Contribution Plan Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Investment Profile of Plan Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Plan Options 
(%) 
Plan 
Participants 
 (%) 
Plan 
Assets 
(%) 
 
Asset Allocation: 
Cash   14.99  14.21  17.88 
Fixed Income    13.78  7.94  5.83 
U.S. Domestic Stock    58.93  65.82  65.19 
Global Stock-ex U.S.    12.29  12.03  11.10 
 
Public vs. Private Management: 
Cash   14.99  14.21  17.88 
Mutual (Public) Funds    57.17  77.14  69.53 
Institutional  
(Private) Funds 
  27.84 8.64 12.59 
        
Cash   14.99  14.21  17.88 
Fixed Income  Public  7.88  6.60  4.27 
 Private  5.90  1.34  1.56 
U.S. Domestic Stock  Public  40.41  59.44  55.06 
  Private  18.52 6.38 10.13 
Global Stock-ex U.S.  Public  8.88  11.11  10.20 
 Private  3.42  0.92  0.90 
 
Active  vs. Passive Management: 
Actively Managed    92.61  95.55  95.00 
Passively Managed    7.39  4.45  5.00 
        
Cash   14.99  14.21  17.88 
Mutual Funds  Active  56.06  74.71  67.71 
 Passive  1.10  2.44  1.81 
Institutional Funds  Active  21.61  6.63  9.41 
 Passive  6.02  2.01  3.18  
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Table 2 
Risk-Adjusted Performance of Plan and Non-Plan Investment Options: Full Sample Results 
 
In-sample risk-adjusted performance (i.e., alpha) statistics are reported for the complete collection of plan and non-plan investment options over the period January 2000-June 
2007 (Panel A) and three sub-periods: (i) January 2000-June 2002; (ii) July 2002-December 2004; and (iii) January 2005-June 2007 (Panel B).  Alphas were calculated 
relative to three versions of the factor model in (1): (i) a one-factor model using (Rm-RF); (ii) a three-factor model using (Rm-RF), SMB, and HML; and (iii) a four-factor 
model using (Rm-RF), SMB, HML, and MOM.  Statistics indicating the difference in performance between plan and non-plan options and the associated p-values are reported 
in the last two rows for each sample period.  Panel C reports mean, median, and (% Positive) statistics for the differences between plan and non-plan option alphas estimated 
out-of-sample using a modified version of the Fama-MacBeth two-stage technique and aggregated over the 60 monthly cross-sections from July 2002-June 2007. 
 
 
    
One-Factor Model 
  
Three-Factor Model 
  
Four-Factor Model 
 
Option Description 
 
Obs. 
 
Mean 
 
Median
 
% Pos.
  
Mean 
 
Median
 
% Pos.
 
Mean 
 
Median
 
% Pos.
                
Panel A. In-Sample Alphas; Full Period (January 2000-June 2007) 
                
Alpha: All Options  10536  -0.0275 -0.0794 39.76    -0.1132 -0.0928 36.13 -0.1091 -0.0913 36.33 
                 
Alpha: Plan Options  1488  -0.0130 -0.0382 43.78    -0.0307 -0.0268 44.36 -0.0271 -0.0245 44.49 
Alpha: Non-Plan Options  9048  -0.0299 -0.0900 39.10    -0.1268 -0.1072 34.78 -0.1225 -0.1046 34.99 
  Difference    0.0169 0.0518 4.68    0.0961  0.0804 9.58    0.0954  .0801 9.50 
    p-value    0.2692 0.0001 0.0006   0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
                 
Panel B. In-Sample Alphas; Three Sub-Periods 
(i) January 2000-June 2002 
Alpha: Plan Options  216  0.3875 0.2089 65.39   0.0993 0.1261 61.57  0.0995 0.1147 59.72 
Alpha: Non-Plan Options  2928  0.1539 0.0155 51.08   -0.0944 -0.0151 48.36  -0.0911 -0.0282 47.47 
  Difference    0.2336 0.1934  14.31    0.1937 0.1412  13.21  0.1906 0.1429  12.25 
    p-value    0.0001 0.0002 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004 0.0005
(ii) July 2002-December 2004 
Alpha: Plan Options  535  -0.0310 -0.0356 46.36    -0.1272 -0.0873 34.02 -0.1277 -0.0902 33.46 
Alpha: Non-Plan Options  3706  -0.1022 -0.1334 35.20    -0.2042 -0.1925 23.45 -0.2026 -0.1909 23.45 
  Difference    0.0712 0.0978 11.16    0.0770 0.1052  10.57    0.0749 0.1007  10.01 
    p-value    0.0001 0.0001 0.0001   0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(iii) January 2005-June 2007 
Alpha: Plan Options  737  -0.1129 -0.0585 35.82   0.0013 -0.0143 46.81  0.0088 -0.0079 48.03 
Alpha: Non-Plan Options  2414  -0.1412 -0.0977 30.61   -0.0471 -0.0576 35.71  -0.0377 -0.0514 37.57 
  Difference    0.0283 0.0392  5.21    0.0484 0.0433  11.10    0.0465 0.0435  10.46 
    p-value    0.0173 0.0001 0.0079  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001   0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
 
Panel C. Out-of-Sample Aggregated Alphas;  Truncated Full Period (January 2002-June 2007) 
Alpha Diff: [Plan - Non-Plan]  60  0.0653  0.0315  65.00   0.0640  0.0449  71.67   0.0643  0.0418  71.67 
    p-value    0.0006 0.1228 0.0201    0.0004 0.0444 0.0008    0.0008 0.0286 0.0008  
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Table 3 
Factor-Matched Performance Comparison of Plan and Non-Plan Investment Options 
 
In-sample risk-adjusted performance (i.e., alpha) statistics are reported for the full collection of plan options and non-plan investment options over the period 
January 2000-June 2007.  In Panel A, both the entire plan and non-plan samples are sorted into 16 bins according to whether their beta exposures from the 
four-factor version of equation (1) fall above or below the sample median for a given risk factor.  Differences in (i) mean alpha, (iii) median alpha, and (iii) 
percentage of positive alphas are listed for each factor-matched bin along with the p-values indicating the statistical significance of those differentials.  In 
Panel B, each plan option is compared with its “nearest neighbor” non-plan option, defined as the alternative whose factor beta estimates most closely match 
those of the respective plan option.  The display lists the risk-adjusted return differentials (i.e., plan option minus non-plan neighbor) that fall at various 
breakpoints of the frequency distribution, as well as the mean value and percentage of positive differentials.  Matched-pair frequency distributions are also 
shown for the three sub-periods of the full sample.  
 
                
Panel A: Factor-Sorted Bins of Plan and Non-Plan Option Samples 
                
Factor-Sort Bin        Mean Alpha  Median Alpha  % Pos. Alpha 
 
 
(Rm-RF) 
 
 
SMB 
 
 
HML 
 
 
MOM 
 
Plan 
Obs. 
 
Non-Plan 
Obs. 
% (Plan / 
Non-Plan) 
Obs. 
 
 
Diff. 
 
 
p-value 
 
 
Diff. 
 
 
p-value 
 
 
Diff. 
 
 
p-value 
 
Low Low Low Low  96  623  15.41 0.0444  0.0866  0.0256  0.0274  8.66  0.1141 
Low Low Low High 110  540  20.37 0.0711  0.0012  0.0618  0.0001  19.28  0.0002 
High Low Low Low 136  570  23.86 0.0335  0.2596  0.0265  0.0001  -10.16  0.0078 
High Low Low High  77  558  13.80 0.0711  0.0431  0.0991  0.0023  9.71  0.0408 
Low Low High Low  154 1010  15.25 0.0822  0.0008  0.0659  0.0003  15.34  0.0004 
Low Low High High  73  364  20.06 0.0612  0.1312  0.0273  0.0013  3.18  0.6129 
High Low High Low  61  577  10.57 0.0963  0.0214  0.0577  0.0047  0.51  0.9251 
High Low High High  36  283  12.72 0.0047  0.9203  0.0547  0.0740  -6.56  0.3239 
Low High Low Low  31  174  17.82 0.2035  0.0295  0.1910  0.0032  26.59  0.0058 
Low High Low High 126  588  21.43 0.1993  0.0001  0.1255  0.0001  21.09  0.0001 
High High Low Low  55  397  13.85 0.1412  0.1424  0.1493  0.4724  9.18  0.1876 
High High Low High 163 1024  15.92 0.1142  0.0160  0.1458  0.0140  11.87  0.0039 
Low High High Low  93  676  13.76 0.1383  0.0069  0.1191  0.0003  15.89  0.0033 
Low High High High  81  529  15.31 0.2211  0.0015  0.1353  0.0123  18.67  0.0010 
High High High Low  91  524  17.37 -0.0658  0.2923  0.0173  0.7209  -14.09  0.0089 
High High High High  105 611 17.86 0.0963  0.0870  0.1035  0.0005  12.13  0.0170 
     1,488  9,048              
                   
     Average:  16.59 0.0945    0.0878    8.83    
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Table 3 (cont.) 
Factor-Matched Performance Comparison of Plan and Non-Plan Investment Options 
 
 
 
               
Panel B: Risk-Adjusted Return Differentials for Plan Option and “Nearest Neighbor” Non-Plan Options 
               
    Return Differential Frequency Distribution     
 
Sample Period 
 
Obs. 
 
Min 
 
5% 
 
10% 
 
25% 
 
50% 
 
75% 
 
90% 
 
95% 
 
Max 
 
Mean 
% Positive 
Differentials 
                   
Jan 2000-Jun 2007  1488  -3.6742  -0.4234  -0.2364  -0.0550 0.0219 0.1295 0.3352 0.5448 3.2493 0.0397  61.76 
p-value             0.0001 0.0001 
                   
(i) Jan 2000-Jun 2002  216  -2.5222  -0.9991  -0.6051  -0.1614 0.0235 0.2767 0.8247 1.2311 3.2493 0.0726  58.80 
p-value             0.1057 0.0097 
                  
(ii) Jul 2002-Dec 2004  535  -3.6742  -0.3803  -0.2266  -0.0624 0.0217 0.1507 0.3350 0.4879 1.3568 0.0364  59.81 
p-value             0.0077 0.0001 
                   
(iii) Jan 2005-Jun 2007  737  -1.0263  -0.3113  -0.1738  -0.0402 0.0218 0.0984 0.2550 0.3890 1.2964 0.0324  64.04 
p-value             0.0001 0.0001 
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 Table 4  
Risk-Adjusted Performance of Plan and Non-Plan Investment Options: Actively Managed Options 
 
In-sample risk-adjusted performance (i.e., alpha) statistics are reported for the complete collection of plan and non-plan investment options that were actively managed over 
the period January 2000-June 2007 (Panel A) and three sub-periods: (i) January 2000-June 2002; (ii) July 2002-December 2004; and (iii) January 2005-June 2007 (Panel B).  
Alphas were calculated relative to three versions of the factor model in (1): (i) a one-factor model using (Rm-RF); (ii) a three-factor model using (Rm-RF), SMB, and HML; 
and (iii) a four-factor model using (Rm-RF), SMB, HML, and MOM.  Statistics indicating the difference in performance between plan and non-plan options and the associated 
p-values are reported in the last two rows for each sample period.  Panel C reports mean, median, and (% Positive) statistics for the differences between plan and non-plan 
option alphas estimated out-of-sample using a modified version of the Fama-MacBeth two-stage technique and aggregated over the 60 monthly cross-sections from July 2002-
June 2007. 
 
    
One-Factor Model 
  
Three-Factor Model 
  
Four-Factor Model 
 
Option Description 
 
Obs. 
 
Mean 
 
Median
 
% Pos.
  
Mean 
 
Median
 
% Pos.
 
Mean 
 
Median
 
% Pos.
                
Panel A. In-Sample Alphas; Full Period (January 2000-June 2007) 
                
Alpha: All Options  10368  -0.0272 -0.0797 39.97    -0.1143 -0.0942 36.24 -0.1101 -0.0921 36.44 
                
Alpha: Plan Options  1350  -0.0051 -0.0269 45.68    -0.0285 -0.0193 45.93 -0.0246 -0.0153 46.07 
Alpha: Non-Plan Options  9018  -0.0305 -0.0901 39.12    -0.1271 -0.1074 34.79 -0.1229 -0.1048 35.00 
  Difference    0.0254 0.0632 6.56    0.0986 0.0881  11.14    0.0983 0.0895  11.07 
    p-value    0.1145 0.0001 0.0001   0.0001 0.0001 0.0001   0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
                  
Panel B. In-Sample Alphas; Three Sub-Periods 
(i) January 2000-June 2002 
Alpha: Plan Options  209  0.3925 0.2269 66.67   0.0979 0.1259 61.72  0.0982 0.1187 59.81 
Alpha: Non-Plan Options  2918  0.1524 0.0155 51.08   -0.0952 -0.0158 48.25  -0.0919 -0.0288 47.36 
  Difference    0.2401 0.2114  15.59    0.1931  0.1417  13.47    0.1901 0.1475  12.45 
    p-value    0.0001 0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0008 0.0005
(ii) July 2002-Decemer 2004 
Alpha: Plan Options  485  -0.0285 -0.0288 47.01   -0.1303 -0.0873 35.05  -0.1307 -0.0902 34.43 
Alpha: Non-Plan Options  3695  -0.1023 -0.1334 35.19   -0.2045 -0.1934 23.49  -0.2029 -0.1915 23.49 
  Difference    0.0738 0.1046  11.82    0.0742  0.1061  11.56    0.0722 0.1013  10.94 
    p-value    0.0001 0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(iii) January 2005-June 2007 
Alpha: Plan Options  656  -0.1097 -0.0491 38.26   0.0065 -0.0082 48.93  0.0148 0.0010 50.31 
Alpha: Non-Plan Options  2405  -0.1413 -0.0907 30.68   -0.0470 -0.0574 35.80  -0.0376 -0.0510 37.67 
  Difference    0.0316 0.0416  7.58    0.0535  0.0492  13.13    0.0524 0.0520  12.64 
    p-value    0.0117 0.0001 0.0002  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
 
Panel C. Out-of-Sample Aggregated Alphas;  Truncated Full Period (January 2002-June 2007) 
Alpha Diff: [Plan - Non-Plan]  60  0.0639  0.0446  66.67   0.0625  0.0500  68.33   0.0634  0.0503  71.67 
    p-value    0.0005  0.2097  0.0098    0.0005 0.0237 0.0043    0.0015 0.0382 0.0008  
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 Table 5 
Risk-Adjusted Performance of Plan and Non-Plan Investment Options: Passively Managed Options 
 
In-sample risk-adjusted performance (i.e., alpha) statistics are reported for the complete collection of plan and non-plan investment options that were passively managed over 
the period January 2000-June 2007 (Panel A) and three sub-periods: (i) January 2000-June 2002; (ii) July 2002-December 2004; and (iii) January 2005-June 2007 (Panel B).  
Alphas were calculated relative to three versions of the factor model in (1): (i) a one-factor model using (Rm-RF); (ii) a three-factor model using (Rm-RF), SMB, and HML; 
and (iii) a four-factor model using (Rm-RF), SMB, HML, and MOM.  Statistics indicating the difference in performance between plan and non-plan options and the associated 
p-values are reported in the last two rows for each sample period.  Panel C reports mean, median, and (% Positive) statistics for the differences between plan and non-plan 
option alphas estimated out-of-sample using a modified version of the Fama-MacBeth two-stage technique and aggregated over the 60 monthly cross-sections from July 2002-
June 2007. 
 
    
One-Factor Model 
  
Three-Factor Model 
  
Four-Factor Model 
 
Option Description 
 
Obs. 
 
Mean 
 
Median
 
% Pos.
  
Mean 
 
Median
 
% Pos.
 
Mean 
 
Median
 
% Pos.
                
Panel A. In-Sample Alphas; Full Period (January 2000-June 2007) 
                
Alpha: All Options  168  -0.0491 -0.0718 26.79    -0.0458 -0.0772 29.76 -0.0465 -0.0794 29.76 
                
Alpha: Plan Options  138  -0.0894 -0.0685 25.36    -0.0519 -0.0766 28.99 -0.0520 -0.0794 28.99 
Alpha: Non-Plan Options  30  0.1362 -0.0886 33.33    -0.0177 -0.0892 33.33 -0.0209 -0.0795 33.33 
  Difference    0.0468 0.0201  -7.97   -0.0342  0.0126  -4.34   -0.0311  0.0001  -4.34 
    p-value    0.0022 0.4218 0.3730  0.3283 0.6879 0.6379  0.3715 1.000  0.6379
                 
Panel B. In-Sample Alphas; Three Sub-Periods 
(i) January 2000-June 2002 
Alpha: Plan Options  7  0.2440 -0.0590 28.57   0.1436 0.1419 57.14  0.1387 0.1120 57.14 
Alpha: Non-Plan Options  10  0.6101 0.3166 50.00   0.1345 0.1266 80.00  0.1261 0.1004 80.00 
  Difference    -0.3661  -0.3756  -21.43    0.0091 0.0153 -22.86    0.0126 0.0116 -22.86 
    p-value    0.3941 0.7782 0.3914  0.9519 0.4990 0.3234 0.9307 0.4990 0.3234
(ii) July 2002-Decemer 2004 
Alpha: Plan Options  50  -0.0556 -0.1312 40.00   -0.0970 -0.0897 24.00  -0.0986 -0.0899 24.00 
Alpha: Non-Plan Options  11  -0.0773 -0.1624 36.36   -0.1160 -0.1093 9.09  -0.1145 -0.1103 9.09 
  Difference    0.0217  0.0312  3.64    0.0190 0.0196  14.91    0.0159 0.0204  14.91 
    p-value    0.7392 0.7866 0.8246  0.7567 0.1114 0.2783 0.7978 0.1114 0.2783
(iii) January 2005-June 2007 
Alpha: Plan Options  81  -0.1391 -0.0680 16.05   -0.0410 -0.0711 29.63  -0.0397 -0.0773 29.63 
Alpha: Non-Plan Options  9  -0.1294 -0.0821 11.11   -0.0668 -0.1056 11.11  -0.0697 -0.1084 11.11 
  Difference    -0.0097  0.0141  4.94    0.0258 0.0345  18.52    0.0300 0.0311  18.52 
    p-value    0.8978 0.2945 0.6998  0.4712 0.7268 0.2419 0.4190 0.7268 0.2419
 
Panel C. Out-of-Sample Aggregated Alphas;  Truncated Full Period (January 2002-June 2007) 
Alpha Diff: [Plan - Non-Plan]  60  0.0448  -0.0032  48.33    0.0905 0.0479  61.67    0.1158 0.1025  65.00 
    p-value    0.5257  0.3502  0.7963    0.0216 0.3061 0.0707    0.0068 0.2591 0.0201  
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Table 6 
Risk-Adjusted Performance of Actively Managed Plan Options: Public vs. Private Funds 
 
Risk-adjusted performance (i.e., alpha) statistics are reported for the sample of actively managed plan investment options according to whether the fund was (i) 
privately managed in an institutional account; or (ii) managed in a public fund.  In-sample alphas were computed over the full period from January 2000-June 
2007 while out-of sample alphas were generated using a modified version of the Fama-MacBeth two-stage technique and aggregated over the 60 monthly cross 
sections from July 2002-June 2007.  All alphas were calculated relative to three versions of the factor model in (1): (i) a one-factor model using (Rm-RF); (ii) a 
three-factor model using (Rm-RF), SMB, and HML; and (iii) a four-factor model using (Rm-RF), SMB, HML, and MOM.  Summary performance measures 
were pooled in three ways: (i) equally weighted (Panel A); (ii) participant-weighted (Panel B); and (iii) plan asset-weighted (Panel C). Mean, median, and (% 
Positive) statistics indicating the difference in performance between public and private active plan options and the associated p-values are reported in the last 
two rows for the in-sample alphas; similar statistics are reported for the out-of-sample alpha differential between public and private active funds. 
 
 
 
 
    
One-Factor Model 
  
Three-Factor Model 
  
Four-Factor Model 
 
Option Description 
 
Obs. 
 
Mean 
 
Median
 
% Pos.
  
Mean 
 
Median
 
% Pos.
 
Mean 
 
Median
 
% Pos.
                
Panel A. Equal-Weighted Averages 
 
A.1  In-Sample Alphas; Full Period (January 2000-June 2007) 
                
Alpha: All Active Options  1350  -0.0051 -0.0269 45.68   -0.0285 -0.0193 45.93  -0.0246 -0.0153 46.07 
                
Alpha: Active Public  1003  -0.0022 -0.0432 43.42   -0.0308 -0.0225 46.76  -0.0274 -0.0230 46.26 
Alpha: Active Private  347  -0.0137 0.0070 52.16   -0.0220 -0.0161 43.52  -0.0165 -0.0116 45.53 
  Difference    0.0115 -0.0502  -8.74    -0.0088 -0.0064  3.24    -0.0109 -0.0114  0.73 
    p-value    0.6756 0.0034 0.0049  0.6817 0.4935 0.2961   0.6077 0.1522 0.8146
 
A.2  Out-of-Sample Aggregated Alphas;  Truncated Full Period (January 2002-June 2007) 
                  
Alpha Differential:  
[Active Public – Active Private] 60  -0.0815  -0.0621  40.00 
 
-0.0505 -0.0444  45.00 
 
-0.0476 -0.0268  41.67 
    p-value    0.1041 0.0484 0.1213    0.1876 0.1757 0.4386    0.2223 0.1306 0.1967 
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Table 6 (cont.) 
Risk-Adjusted Performance of Actively Managed Plan Options: Public vs. Private Funds 
 
 
    
One-Factor Model 
  
Three-Factor Model 
  
Four-Factor Model 
 
Option Description 
 
Obs. 
 
Mean 
 
Median
 
% Pos.
  
Mean 
 
Median
 
% Pos.
 
Mean 
 
Median
 
% Pos.
                
Panel B. Participant-Weighted Averages 
 
B.1  In-Sample Alphas; Full Period (January 2000-June 2007) 
                
Alpha: Active Public  1003  -0.0125 -0.0662 44.53    0.0102 0.0515 58.50 0.0168 0.0568 58.15 
Alpha: Active Private  347  -0.0048 -0.0195 47.17    -0.0089 -0.0160 43.81 -0.0032 -0.0098 46.36 
  Difference    -0.0077 -0.0467 -2.64    0.1101 0.0675  14.69    0.0200 0.0666  11.79 
    p-value    0.8773 --- ---   0.6420 ---  ---  0.6146 ---  --- 
 
B.2  Out-of-Sample Aggregated Alphas;  Truncated Full Period (January 2002-June 2007) 
                  
Alpha Differential:  
[Active Public – Active Private] 60  -0.0356  -0.0295  48.33 
 
0.0208 0.0324  56.67 
 
0.0227 0.0282  56.67 
    p-value    0.3310 0.1774 0.7963    0.5214 0.4311 0.3017    0.5076 0.6989 0.3017 
                 
                 
Panel C. Plan Asset-Weighted Averages 
 
C.1  In-Sample Alphas; Full Period (January 2000-June 2007) 
                
Alpha: Active Public  1003  -0.0070 -0.0507 45.87   0.0184 0.0515 58.64  0.0256 0.0529 58.27 
Alpha: Active Private  347  0.0179 0.0133 53.31    -0.0150 -0.0216 42.24 -0.0094 -0.0145 43.66 
  Difference    -0.0249  -0.0640  -7.44    0.0334  0.0731  16.40    0.0350 0.0674  14.61 
    p-value    0.4681 --- ---   0.1927 --- ---  0.1623 --- --- 
 
C.2  Out-of-Sample Aggregated Alphas;  Truncated Full Period (January 2002-June 2007) 
                  
Alpha Differential:  
[Active Public – Active Private] 60  -0.0395  -0.0640  36.67 
 
0.0245 0.0057  51.67 
 
0.0161 -0.0108  48.33 
    p-value    0.3221 0.0842 0.0389    0.4946 0.8974 0.7963    0.6667 0.8974 0.7963 
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Table 7 
Risk-Adjusted Performance of Actively Managed Plan Options: Plan-Specific Determinants 
 
Panel A reports Spearman rank correlation coefficients between in-sample alphas for actively managed plan options 
(ALPHA) and three different variables: (i) the total value of participant holdings in a particular option (MKTVAL), 
(ii) the number of distinct plans offering a particular option (PLANFRQ), and (iii) the number of participants 
holding a particular option (PARTFRQ).  Alphas were computed using the four-factor version of equation (1) and p-
values are reported beneath each correlation coefficient.  Panel B reports mean values for ALPHA, MKTVAL, 
PLANFRQ, and PARTFRQ within sample terciles sorted by the plan’s in-sample risk-adjusted performance 
statistic.  Results are reported for the entire sample period as well as three non-overlapping 30-month sub-periods. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Spearman Rank Correlation with Plan Option Risk-Adjusted Performance (ALPHA) 
 
Period 
 
Obs. 
 
MKTVAL 
 
PLANFRQ 
 
PARTFRQ 
 
 
 
January 2000-June 2007 
 
1350 
 
0.1078 
 
0.0886 
 
0.0533 
 
    p-value    0.0001  0.0011  0.0505   
January  2000-June  2002  209  0.0798 0.0505 0.0800   
    p-value    0.2506  0.4674  0.2498   
July  2002-December  2004  485  0.1062 -0.0404 0.0746   
    p-value    0.0193  0.3749  0.1006   
January  2005-June  2007  656  0.1148 0.1405 0.0947   
    p-value    0.0032  0.0003  0.0153   
 
 
Panel B: Mean Values of Variables in ALPHA-Sorted Terciles 
 
 
Period 
 
 
Tercile (Obs)
 
ALPHA 
 
MKTVAL 
($ Mil) 
 
PLANFRQ 
 
PARTFRQ 
(Thousands)
 
January 2000-June 2007 
 
Low (448) 
 
-0.3350 
 
418.412 
 
512.00 
 
28.360 
 Mid  (451)  -0.0215  757.402  657.33  49.470 
  High  (451)  0.2808 645.596 849.52  41.489 
 
  (i) January 2000-June 2002 
 
Low (69) 
 
-0.4603 
 
535.462 
 
917.36 
 
49.824 
 Mid  (70)  0.0852  1,614.997  1,362.44  126.918 
  High  (70)  0.6616 419.419 900.07  37.280 
 
  (ii) July 2002-December 2004 
 
Low (161) 
 
-0.4636 
 
218.572 
 
417.20 
 
18.542 
 Mid  (162)  -0.0999  886.718  801.65  55.485 
  High  (162)  0.1693 597.133 654.47  37.781 
 
  (iii) January 2005-June 2007 
 
Low (218) 
 
-0.2005 
 
528.952 
 
453.70 
 
28.819 
  Mid  (219)  0.0024 387.626 325.19  20.266 
  High  (219)  0.2415 753.739 977.65  45.577 
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Figure 1.  Organizational Structure of a Defined Contribution Retirement Plan.  This figure summarizes the various relationships 
that exist between the four primary economic agents involved in a defined contribution retirement plan: the plan participant, the plan 
sponsor, the plan administrator/service provider, and the plan investment managers.  The main feature of this structure is that plan 
sponsor has the fiduciary duty to create the menu of available plan investment options, but the plan participant is responsible for 
choosing the specific options that constitute the invested portfolio. 
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